My
mate, Hamish,
tells a story of climbing with Bridwell
(only Zoomers will need to ask AI who Bridwell was) on the big walls
of Squamish in British Columbia, Canada. Night was falling and the
pair needed to rappel (abseil) off the mountain. Bridwell slung an
old stump left somewhere on a ledge (an un-anchored stump) and asked
Hamish to sit on the stump while he (Bridwell) rappelled down. The
stump wobbled but held, and Bridwell called up “off rappel.”
Hamish, of course, now had to follow Bridwell down the ropes but
without anyone to sit on the stump to hold it in place. Breathing
out to lighten his stocky frame, down Hamish went. The anchor held,
and the two were set to climb another day.
Hamish on the first ascent of Kerouac Crack,
Zoomers will need to look up Kerouac
Years ago Doug and I climbed a little peak called The Tooth in the Cascade Range near Snoqualmie Pass in Washington.
The south face is a very pleasant outing with climbing to Ewbank
Grade 10 (about 5.4) which we climbed in a couple of roped pitches
separated by some easy scrambling. We found ample fixed rappel
stations to descend to Pineapple Pass where we decided to rappel
straight down to the talus basin below instead of the longer more
rambly approach route we had taken around the back of a big rock
tower which makes up one side of Pineapple Pass. With a 60 metre
rope, we had to stretch the rope right to the 30 metre mark to find a
decent rappel station for the last rappel and were shocked to find at
around 25 metres, some manky tat around a shrub obviously used by
some desperate party to abseil off. This was a shrub; not a bush,
not a small tree, merely twigs of a shrub the size of a small
blueberry bush lashed together with a bit of webbing. Desperate and
dangerous.

Prepped for route cleaning In BC, Canada
If you do anything long enough, even if you try to minimise risk,
you have, if not an accident, at least an incident. Doug has
rappelled off the end of his rope while cleaning climbing routes in
Canada, and I have come exceptionally close in Australia (with rope
stretch I just reached the ground and when unweighted the rope ended
a metre or so above the ground). Once in City of Rocks, Idaho, while
rappelling Cruel Shoes, we discovered that, contrary to what the
guidebook indicated, our doubled 60 metre rope did not reach the
anchor. This involved some jiggery pokery to get to the final rappel
anchor including Doug down-climbing the 5.7 (grade 14) route! I’m
embarrassed to say this is only a mere sampling of near accidents I
have had while abseiling!
Stripe Rock, Idaho, location of Cruel Shoes
No-one should be doing any of these things. They are ridiculously
dangerous if not outright foolish. But, among all my mountain incidents, I have never had an abseil anchor pull
completely. While abseil accidents are regrettably common, most
accidents occur when the sling fails, the gear pulls, or, infrequently terrain features such as horns,
completely fail. Occasionally, people sling boulders which then roll right
down the mountain. I remember one such incident from years ago in
the Rocky Mountains of Alberta but, luckily the individual involved
only fell a few metres because they were on terrain that most people
would down-climb.
Down climbing Escalade in the Purcell Mountains
Bolt failures are relatively rare, but not unknown. In 2015, the
UIAA (International Climbing and Mountaineering Foundation) published
guidelines
on stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of stainless steel bolts installed
in climbing areas. Notably, Taiwan is one of the areas where SCC has
been confirmed, but SCC most commonly occurs in areas close to the
ocean and does not typically involve the entire bolt pulling out.
Entire bolt pulls out is one of those low probability – high
consequence events that people have trouble wrapping their heads
around. The likelihood of the event is so low that it is very easy
to get lured into a problematic situation where suddenly, it’s all good until it isn’t. The low probability-high consequence
event is an absolute classic in avalanche incidents.
Mank on a route in the southern highlands of NSW
The Rescued Podcast (yes, there is the usual “but how did you
feel” 20 minute introduction to get through) recently aired the
story of three canyoners descending an “expedition” canyon in
Taiwan. I can’t say I know what “expedition” canyoning is
because people call a three day ski tour an “expedition” these
days, but, apparently, the canyon the group were descending was
infrequently traversed and required multiple days (or at least two;
my mate Hamish would always say that a two pitch route is not
multi-pitch) to complete. On the second day, the group approached an
abseil down a waterfall that crossed a ledge and ended in a pool. A
single bolt described as “an odd style expansion bolt” was found
with a piece of cordellette tied around the bolt with the nut
securing the cordellette on top. The protagonist describes this
procedure as common in “expedition” canyoning to save weight. To
a climber, this sounds, well, we can say the word again according to
DJT, retarded. Your life is worth the weight of a hangar! And, if
you put a maillon on the cordellette, you are close to the weight of
an actual hangar!
More mank also in the southern highlands, NSW
Apparently the bolt that “wasn’t quite an expansion bolt”
had a pin in the middle. This sounds like a hammer drive pin bolt designed for attaching materials like wood to
concrete for “light to medium duty projects.” I’ve never
actually seen one of these in the wild and I started climbing in the
days of homemade hangars and button head bolts. But strange things do happen and bits of gear get
used in inappropriate ways, like the two young blokes who “bolted” the Calgary Route (YDS 5.6 or Ewbank 13) on Mount Yamnuska, a
decades old traditional route climbed by thousands of people without
weird manky bolts and home-made dog-bones.
Woolies grade orange nylon cord used as an abseil anchor, Bungonia Creek
The first person down the abseil (the lightest individual in the
group) inspected the surrounding rock around the bolt. It was
described as “not spectacular.” The only attempt to test the
bolt appears to have been a couple of jerks onto the anchor while the
individual was standing on a ledge rigged to abseil. This, of
course, is far less than even body weight plus backpack which is the
absolute minimum an abseil anchor should hold. Abseil forces can
reach up to 2 or even 2.5 kN (kilonewtons) even when the abseil is
relatively controlled (not bouncing around like a lunatic).
It is a free hanging abseil down
from Lost Arrow Spire in Idaho
The individual went ahead and rigged her abseil, “grovelled
down” attempting to only put a downward pull on the bolt not an
outward pull, and reached the pool at the bottom safely. The next
bloke down was a big fellow who probably outweighed the first
abseiler by 30 kilograms. You know what happens next. That single
anchor pulled and the second canyoner fell to the bottom breaking his
pelvis. What follows is an extraordinary rescue and all involved are
to be commended. But what of the lessons learnt?
This is manky, Mount Keira
Climbers and canyoners need to understand that it is really
difficult if not impossible to determine the reliability of installed
bolts by visual inspection. Unless the bolt is incredibly manky and
pulls out with finger strength, you simply have no idea what
condition the bolt is in. In this particular instance, the bolt used
is wholly unfit for purpose and should never be trusted as a single
anchor point in any event. As with most things in life, the edge
case is easy to recognise but the middle ground where most of life’s
events occur is opaque.
Rappeling down a bare ice slope in the Monashees
because we all have very big backpacks.
But, if you were absolutely desperate to use that single bolt, you
could back it up with another piece of gear, or, if that is not
available consider a temporary back up with a meat anchor and send the heaviest person first, the lightest person
goes last. Still, this is incredibly dodgy because bolts have been
known to fail on the second and third person down, and you must make
sure that your meat anchor is only back up and does not take the
load. If you get the rigging wrong you are not actually testing the
anchor.
Slung horn in the Selkirk Mountains
Guides talk about a concept called “error correction,” whereby errors are corrected as swiftly as
possible. Sometimes, however, an error is so great that you simply
cannot recover and all the things you did after the event mean very
little, at least in terms of risk mitigation. Years ago, one of my
friends set off to ski the south face (the sun drenched aspect in North
America) of a big peak in the Purcell Mountains in early May. They
left the trail-head at 11 am! If you are going to ski a south facing
avalanche prone bowl in spring, you are at the summit above the ski descent by 9 am at the latest. It is very hard to
correct for a catastrophic error of judgement. You might, as this
party did, prevent further issues from arising, but sometimes the
error is so extreme that the worst possible consequences have already
arisen.
Skiing up Mount Brennan in spring
What about abseiling off single point anchors? Climbers,
particularly in alpine environments do this all the time. It is with
the caveat, however, that the single point anchor is absolutely
bomber! And you must be 100% confident in your anchor because you
are 100% dependent on it. If you can’t meet that exacting
standard, do something else. Ironically, this team was carrying a
bolt kit and put a bolt in after the accident.
Bolting a new route in the Kootenays
It is amazing what people will do rappelling. And I’m not
pointing fingers at the canyoning group because I have been on
climbing trips where Doug has down-climbed entire 30 metre pitches
just so we could avoid leaving a couple of chocks as an anchor. How
stupid is that! In fact, I’ve probably made most of the mistakes
pointed out in this article, notably, the ridiculous frugality that suddenly swamps
the minds of otherwise sensible and cautious climbers who are
probably going to blow more than the price of a couple of wires
at the local bar that evening. Mind you, there are limits. Two of
my friends once retreated off the south ridge of Mount Gimli in an
advancing storm and left about a thousand bucks of gear on the climb!
Simul rappelling (not recommended)
There is a lot of talk about risk in the podcast. The injured
canyoner believes that “risk is, is something that you
have to, what you can calculate, of course [sic].” But this is
not how risk works. Risk is the intersection between probability and
consequence overlaid with exposure and vulnerability and while we
might be able to estimate consequences relatively reliably,
estimating probability is much less precise. The consequence of
falling to the bottom of a pitch is likely catastrophic but how do we
estimate the likelihood (probability) of a bolt of unknown origin
pulling? Is it 10%, 20%, 90%, and even if the likelihood was only 1%
would you do it if the consequence was a broken pelvis in a remote
location? But it’s really exposure and vulnerability which cause
the problem. Had the party backed up the anchor, or used a different
anchor, they would have had no exposure and no vulnerability. Simply
put, there would be no accident, no injury, no complex rescue. When
it is hard to assess probability sometimes the safest solution is
simply to avoid exposure. This is succinctly summed up in the adage
commonly used in the ski-guiding community: if the question is stability, the answer is terrain.
Extensive avalanches in Ymir bowl
Another member of the party when asked about risk responded “I
come up with these problems of what happens if I have this issue and
I only have this set of gear and I make do and figure it out.”
This is the gear fallacy. The idea that every problem you have can be solved by
having more gear or using the gear you have in different ways.
Canyoners seem particularly susceptible to the gear fallacy, whereas the issue is not that
you have insufficient gear, it’s that you are not thinking
accurately about the situation. Interestingly enough, this
particular accident is one of the few that actually could be
prevented by using more gear. Back up the anchor or put in a second
bolt. Consequence, probability, exposure and vulnerability all
managed by one action.
Hamish rappelling off a horn in the Purcell Mountains
The third member of the party when asked about risk said “just
trying to work out what could possibly go wrong and how I can fix
it.” This isn’t a bad answer but is a little bit arse
backward because fixing things after they have gone wrong is
appropriate for error correction but not for risk mitigation.
Risk mitigation is actually about assessing probability,
consequence, vulnerability and exposure and modifying these
constructs to plan and conduct an adventure that fits within your own
acceptable risk. There’s a very good Tedx video here
which presents these concepts in a model suitable for outdoor
adventurers. In the video, Statham describes a complex ascent of a
large mountain where the usual camp for the summit attempt was under
a large ice cliff. Dozens of parties had camped in the exact same
location but Statham’s crew deemed the consequence catastrophic
even though the risk was low. They used a different summit day
strategy and avoided the camp.
But it’s hard to appropriately assess a risk mitigation strategy
if you don’t first recognise the risk. This seems to have been the
issue with the canyoning party. The concept of a single bolt anchor
failing was never seriously considered so no mitigation strategies
were considered. And it’s easy, in the excitement of the day or
the even the pressure of time to push forward without considering the
edge case – the high consequence, low probability, high exposure
and vulnerability event – when suddenly, your best day ever becomes
your worst.